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4. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78-2-2 (j), Utah Code 1987-1988. 
5. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The appeal was brought by the defendant pursuant to 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 3(a). The State of 
Utah brought a forfeiture action in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Utah in an in rem proceeding against nine thousand one 
hundred and ninety nine dollars, U.S. currency, one pager and 
one Smith & Wesson gun on February 19, 1988. A trial was held 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya on September 9, 1988. On 
October 13, 1988, an order was entered granting the state 
forfeiture against all defendants. 
6. THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. When did the state's interest in the defendant 
currency vest? 
2. Is the state entitled to forfeiture by a 
preponderance of the evidence? 
3. Can forfeitable funds be used to pay attorney's 
fees? 
7. DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The interpretation of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13, 
(1988) is determinative and is set forth as an addendum to this 
brief. 
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8. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was brought by the state pursuant to a 
violation of the controlled substances act by Charles Goodson, 
The state initiated proceedings on February 19, 1988. Four 
attempts at service were unsuccessful at four different 
addresses. On April 1, 1988, service was perfected at the Salt 
Lake County Jail. Charles Goodson failed to respond to the 
notice and complaint and default was entered on May 2, 1988. 
Charles Goodson1s default was set aside, he filed an 
answer and counterclaimed against the state. On June 3, 1988, 
the state filed an answer to Charles Goodson's counterclaim. 
On June 13, 1988, Judge James S. Sawaya heard summary judgment 
arguments made by both parties. On June 20, 1988, Judge Sawaya 
denied both motions. 
On July 13, 1988, plaintiff made a motion to amend its 
complaint and noticed it for August 1, 1988. At the request of 
the defendant, the motion was continued until August 8, 1988 
when it could be heard with defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Judge Sawaya was out of town August 8th and heard the motions 
on August 22, 1988. Both motions were denied. Trial was set 
for September 9, 1988. 
On September 9, 1988, Judge Sawaya took the matter 
under advisement and on September 13, 1988, ordered the 
defendant property forfeited to the State of Utah. Judgment 
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was entered on October 13, 1988. 
On January 7, 1988, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office was executing a search warrant at 1545 S. Green Street 
Apartment 2. (R.4-5). Charles Goodson was present at that 
address. (R.5). Charles Goodson was seated leaning over a 
coffee table where cocaine was located and a propane torch was 
going with a cocaine bomb over it. (R.6-7). Charles Goodson 
was arrested and searched. (R.9). 
Located on Charles Goodson1s person was the defendant 
currency and cocaine. (R.10). Charles Goodson requested to 
have one final hit off the pipe before being transported to 
jail and offered to show the detectives how to cook cocaine. 
(R.ll). 
A loaded gun and beeper were confiscated. (R.12). 
The gun was located underneath Mr. Goodsonfs left side and the 
beeper from the coffee table Mr. Goodson was seated at. (R.12). 
9. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Procedural matters are directory not mandatory. 
Failure to set this for trial within 20 days of the answer 
should not be grounds for a dismissal. The defendant filed 
counterclaims and motions which delayed setting this matter for 
trial. There is no evidence that this case was not given 
priority by the trial judge. In fact, Judge Sawaya heard both 
counsel on various matters before trial. This case was 
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resolved as early as the calendar would permit. 
The search of Charles Goodson's person was proper. He 
was arrested for committing a public offense in the presence of 
a peace officer. The search was no more intrusive than 
necessary and the officer was lawfully on the premises where 
the arrest took place. 
Property that is used or intended for use in violation 
of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) is forfeitable to the 
State of Utah to be disposed of in accordance with that 
statute. At the time of the illegal use, the state's title 
vests. This vesting precludes a subsequent transfer of the 
property to any person for any purpose. 
At trial, the evidence clearly showed that the funds 
in question were used or intended for use to violate the 
controlled substances act. The state relied upon the 
rebuttable presumption afforded to it and the burden was upon 
the claimant to come forward with credible evidence. The trier 
of fact ruled that the claimant failed to come forward and 
ruled that by a preponderance of evidence the state was 
entitled to forfeiture. 
The state's title to the seized items vested at the 
time of the illegal act. The property itself is tainted upon 
the commission of the offense and any attempted transfer is 
null and void. To allow otherwise would encourage violators to 
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transfer their title and effectively put the tainted property 
out of the reach of the state. 
Forfeitable items may not be used to pay for attorney 
fees. Allowing a claimant to use illegally obtained funds to 
pay for attorney fees would be allowing him to profit from his 
wrongs. Any incentive to end the illegal behavior would be 
gone. Also, it does not violate a right to choice of counsel. 
This action is a civil proceeding. Mr. Goodson could have 
obtained counsel that he could afford if he wished to have an 
attorney represent him in this matter. 
10. DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I. PROCEDURAL MATTERS ARE DIRECTORY NOT MANDATORY 
Section 58-37-13 (8) (g) of the Utah Code provides that 
"when an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at 
the end of twenty (20) days, the court shall set the matter for 
hearing within twenty (20) days." The language of the statute 
is clearly directory and not mandatory. 
Generally, where procedural steps are enumerated in a 
statute, they are construed liberally to permit the case to 
proceed on its merits. The Supreme Court of Idaho, when 
addressing the very same issue in interpreting the Idaho 
Controlled Substances Act, stated as follows: 
Where the prescribed procedure is not 
the essence of the thing to be 
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accomplished the statute is generally 
considered directory and not mandatory. 
A contrary conclusion would be 
disruptive to an orderly administration 
of justice and would impair the 
flexibility the trial courts must have 
in setting cases for trial. In the 
absence of a showing of substantial 
prejudice the complaint should not be 
dismissed merely because it was not 
given priority over other civil cases, 
if in fact such priority was not given. 
State v. 1955 Willys, 595 P.2d 299f 303 
(Id. 1979) . 
The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. 1983 Pontiac, 
717 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1986) stated as follows: "The fact 
that the hearing was not set within twenty (20) days was 
clearly a fact that the court could consider in disposing of 
the petition." 
A review of the file in this case shows that there has 
been no unnecessary delay and any delay that the defendant 
perceives was caused by the defendant. There is no allegation 
that the matter was not set as early as Judge Sawaya's calendar 
would allow. 
The affidavits filed in support of the motion to 
dismiss indicate that the alleged unavailable witness left the 
jurisdiction as early as July 7, 1988. (Affidavit in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss). This would have been a mere twenty four 
days from the filing of the final verified answer in this case 
and eighteen days from the summary judgment order. Therefore, 
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defendant's argument that the hearing was not held within the 
twenty-day provision of the statute is clearly not grounds for 
a dismissal in this case. 
II. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE DEFENDANT CURRENCY 
VESTED AT THE TIME OF THE ILLEGAL ACT 
Richard Leedy, the attorney for the defendant 
property, claims that the currency was assigned to him for 
attorney's fees. (R.17). 
Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 is clear: 
"The following are subject to 
forfeiture, and no property right exists 
in them . . . everything of value 
furnished or intended to be furnished in 
exchange for a controlled substance in 
violation of this act, all proceeds 
traceable to any violation of this act, 
and all moneys, negotiable instruments, 
and securities used or intended to be 
used to facilitate any violation of this 
act." 
A civil forfeiture proceeding is an in rem action 
against property. The property itself has committed the 
wrong. Because the property is considered tainted upon the 
commission of the wrongful act, the interest of the government 
vests at the time of the act. U.S. v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 
1486 (10th Cir. 1988). "Illegal use immediately vests title to 
the property in the sovereign, and cuts off the rights of third 
parties to obtain legally protectable interests in the 
property." U.S. v. $41,305.00 In Currency and Traveler's 
Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 1986). Therefore, 
Charles Goodson had no interest to assign, 
III. SEIZED PROPERTY iMAY NOT BE USED 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Tenth Circuit specifically held in U.S. v. Nichols, 
841 F.2d at 1505 that "allowing a defendant to use illegally 
obtained assets to hire an attorney would adversely affect an 
important public interest. There is a public interest in 
stripping defendants of the economic power they derive from 
illegal activity and part of that undeserved power may be the 
ability to command high priced legal talent." That court 
further held that civil forfeiture does not violate the right 
to choice of counsel. U.S. v. Nicholsy id at 1509. 
IV. CHARLES GOODSON WAS SEARCHED 
PURSUANT TO AN ARREST 
The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office was executing a 
warrant at 1545 S. Green Street in Salt Lake County. (R.4-5). 
The officers were legally on the premises. Upon entering, 
Charles Goodson was found leaning over a lighted propane torch 
which was cooking cocaine. (R.6-7). Charles Goodson was 
arrested. (R.9). It is clear that a peace officer may make an 
arrest without a warrant when any public offense is committed 
in his presence or he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and the person arrested is believed to have 
committed it. Utah Code, Section 77-7-3 (1988). 
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It is clear that Charles Goodson was committing a 
public offense in the presence of Kendra Herlin, a peace 
officer of the state. (R.4, 7). He was smoking cocaine. 
(R.7). A person may be searched incident to an arrest. An 
individual in custody may be searched without a warrant to 
determine whether that individual has a weapon or possesses 
evidence which may be concealed or destroyed. The scope of 
such search incident to arrest is to insure against destruction 
of evidence and to protect an officer from harm. State v. 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). Therefore, the search of 
Charles Goodson was proper. 
V. CHARLES GOODSON FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION 
THAT THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY WAS DRUG RELATED 
The search of Charles Goodson yielded cocaine and 
$9,199.00 from his pockets (R.10). A beeper was located on the 
table in front of him. (R.12). Underneath the left side of 
Charles Goodson, a loaded .44 magnum was seized. (R.10). Utah 
Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) provides that: 
"everything of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished in exchange for 
a controlled substance in violation of 
this act, all proceeds traceable to any 
violation of this act, and all moneys, 
negotiable instruments, and securities 
used or intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this act; 
but: 
* * * 
there is a rebuttable presumption that 
all money, coins, and currency found in 
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proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing or 
distributing paraphernalia, or to 
forfeitable records of the importation, 
manufacture, or distribution of 
controlled substances are forfeitable 
under this section; the burden of proof 
is upon claimants of the property to 
rebut this presumption." 
The record clearly indicates that the money seized was 
in proximity to cocaine. (R.10). The burden was upon the 
defendant to come forward with credible evidence to rebut the 
presumption of forfeiture. In Re Indian Trail Trunk Sewer v. 
City of Spokane, 670 P.2d 675, 677 (Wash. App. 1983). 
Charles Goodson alleged that the $7,500.00 was won in 
Wendover, gambling. (R.15). Judge Sawaya found that Charles 
Goodson1s testimony was not credible. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, P.3). "Where the evidence is in conflict, 
we defer to the trial court's first-hand assessment of the 
witnesses' credibility and assume that the trial court believed 
those aspects of the evidence which support its findings." Hal 
Taylor Associates v. Union America, 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 
1982) . 
The gun was seized pursuant to Utah Code, Section 
58-37-13 (1) (i) which provides that property used for protecting 
a controlled substance is forfeitable. The forfeiture of the 
gun was not contested at trial and its forfeiture is not 
contested in this appeal. 
-10-
The defendant beeper was seized from the coffee table 
directly in front of Charles Goodson. (R.12). The seizure was 
proper pursuant to Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1) (b) which 
provides for forfeiture of equipment used for delivering a 
controlled substance. The forfeiture of the beeper is not 
disputed. 
The record clearly demonstrates that all the defendant 
items are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the State of 
Utah. The trial court's decision is supported by the record, 
Utah law and case law. 
VI. RICHARD LEEDYfS TESTIMONY WAS IMPROPER 
Richard Leedy should not have been allowed to testify 
in the trial of this matter after the objection raised by the 
state's counsel. (R.22-28). Rule 3.7 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from acting as advocate 
and witness unless he meets one of the exceptions. Richard 
Leedy did not claim he fell into any enumerated exception. 
(R.22-28). 
Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (9) (h) provides that 
"proceedings of this section are independent of any other 
proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the 
laws of this state." Emphasis added. Mr. Leedy1s testimony 
alleged that Howard Lemcke agreed to return the currency in 
exchange for a plea by Charles Goodson on criminal charges. 
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(R.24). If in fact an agreement existed, which the trial court 
did not find, then it was null and void. 
11, CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah, 
respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of 
the trial court allowing the forfeiture of the defendant 
currency, 
DATED this Q> \ day of March, 1989. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RENA BARBIERO 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
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12, ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) et: seq, 
B. Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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79 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-13 
with federal and other state agencies in discharging 
their responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled 
substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled 
substances. To this end, they are authorized to: 
(a) Arrange for the exchange of information 
between governmental officials concerning the 
use and abuse of dangerous substances. 
(b) Co-ordinate and co-operate in training pro-
grams in controlled substance law enforcement 
at the local and state levels. 
(c) Co-operate with the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bu-
reau of Investigation by establishing a central-
ized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and col-
lect statistics, including records of drug-depen-
dent persons and other controlled substance law 
offenders within the state, and make the infor-
mation available for federal, state, and local law 
enforcement purposes. 
(d) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at 
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant spe-
cies from which controlled substances may be ex-
tracted. 1971 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Sei-
zure — Procedure. 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and no 
property right exists in them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or ac-
quired in violation of this act: 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment 
of any kind used, or intended for use. in manufac-
turing, compounding, processing, delivering, im-
porting, or exporting any controlled substance in 
violation of this act; 
<c) ail property used or intended for use as a 
container for property described in vSubsections 
ilXa) and (l)<b>: 
fd) ail hypodermic needles, syringes, and other 
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with 
health food supplements and herbs, used or in-
tended for use to administer controlled sub-
stances in violation of this act: 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehi-
cles, or vessels used or intended for use, to trans-
port, or in any manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in Subsections <lMa) 
or (1Kb), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a 
common carrier in the transaction of busi-
ness as a common carrier may not be for-
feited under this section unless it appears 
that the owner or other person in charge of 
the conveyance was a consenting party or 
privy to violation of this act: 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited un-
der this section by reason of any act or omis-
sion committed or omitted without the 
owner's knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject 
to a bona fide security interest is subject to 
the interest of a secured party who could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including 
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or .in-
tended for use in violation of this act; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended 
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this act, all proceeds trace-
able to any violation of this act. and all moneys, 
negotiable instruments, and securities used or 
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of 
this act; but: 
(i) An interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act; 
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that 
all money, coins, and currency found in prox-
imity to forfeitable controlled substances, 
drug manufacturing or distributing para-
phernalia, or to forfeitable records of the im-
portation, manufacture, or distribution of 
controlled substances are forfeitable under 
this section; the burden of proof is upon 
claimants of the property to rebut this pre-
sumption; 
(h) ail imitation controlled substances as de-
fined in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
and 
<i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facil-
ities, or interest in real property of any kind 
used, or intended for use. in producing, cultivat-
ing, warehousing, storing, protecting, or manu-
facturing any controlled substances in violation 
of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehous-
ing, or storage facility or interest in real 
property is subject to the bona fide security 
interest of a party who could not have known 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a 
violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act: 
(iii) unless the premises are used in pro-
ducing, cultivating, or manufacturing con-
trolled substances, a housing, warehousing, 
or storage facility or interest in real property 
may not be forfeited under this section un-
less cumulative sales of controlled sub-
stances on the property within a two-month 
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street 
value of any controlled substances found on 
the premises at any given time totals or ex-
ceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced 
in controlled substances law enforcement 
may testify to establish the street value of 
the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act 
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon 
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over 
the property. However, seizure without process may 
be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant or an inspection 
under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in 
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding un-
der this act; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property is directly or indirectly 
dangerous to health or safety; or 
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(d) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property has been used or intended 
to be used in violation of this act. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), 
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted 
promptly. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is 
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforce-
ment agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having 
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this act 
the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated 
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it 
to an appropriate location for disposition in ac-
cordance with law. 
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are pos-
sessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distri-
bution in violation of this act are contraband and 
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. 
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which 
are seized or come into the possession of the state are 
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the 
state if the owners are unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled sub-
stances in Schedules I and II are derived which have 
been planted or cultivated in violation of this act, or 
of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or 
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily for-
feited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its 
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in 
control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an ap-
propriate license or proof that he is the holder of a 
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of 
the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act 
by a finding of the court that no person is entitled to 
recover the property, it shall be deposited in the cus-
tody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all 
property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint 
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing 
agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding 
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited 
property in the enforcement of controlled sub-
stances laws, the district court having jurisdic-
tion over the case shall award the property to the 
seizing agency. The seizing agency shall pay to 
the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in 
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action. Prop-
erty forfeited under this section may not be ap-
plied by the court to costs or fines assessed 
against any defendant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no appli-
cation, any state agency, bureau, county, or mu-
nicipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfei-
ture shall be given the property for use in en-
forcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal 
costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture and 
upon application for the property to the director 
of the Division of Finance. The application shall 
clearly set forth the need for the property and the 
use to which the property will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance 
shall review all applications for property submit-
ted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing 
agency makes no application, make a determina-
tion based on necessity and advisability as to 
final disposition and shall notify the designated 
applicant or seizing agency, where no application 
is made, who may obtain the property upon pay-
ment of all costs to the appropriate department. 
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse 
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of 
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to 
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received 
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remain-
ing after payment shall be returned to the seiz-
ing agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an applica-
tion under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of 
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the prop-
erty by public bidding or where deemed appropri-
ate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be 
upon oath of two officers or employees of the de-
partment having charge of the property, and ver-
ified by the director of the department or his des-
ignated agent. 
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a 
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be 
made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation 
shall be prepared by the county attorney where 
the property was seized or is to be seized and filed 
in the district court. The complaint shall describe 
with reasonable particularity: 
(i) the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the proceeding; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; 
and 
liii) the allegations which constitute a ba-
sis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the 
district court shall forthwith issue a warrant for 
seizure of the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for 
service, unless the property has previously been 
seized without a warrant, under Subsection 
58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfei-
ture shall be filed with the county clerk, and 
served together with a copy of the complaint, 
upon all persons known to die county attorney to 
have a claim in the property by one of the follow-
ing methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and 
address is known, at the last known address 
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose 
right, title, or interest is of record in the Di-
vision of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy 
of the notice and complaint by certified mail 
to the address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is deemed complete 
even though the mail is refused or cannot be 
forwarded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose ad-
dresses are unknown, but who are believed 
to have an interest in the property, by one 
publication in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county where the seizure was 
made. 
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claim-
ant or interested party shall file with the court a 
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this act, any 
interested person or claimant of the property, 
prior to being served with a complaint under this 
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section, may file a petition in the district court 
for release of his interest in the property. The 
petition shall specify the claimant's interest in 
the property and his right to have it released. A 
copy shall be served upon the county attorney in 
the county of the seizure, who shall answer the 
petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not 
answer a complaint of forfeiture. 
(f) After 20 days following service of a com-
plaint or petition for release, the court shall ex-
amine the record and if no answer is on file, the 
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner 
an opportunity to present evidence in support of 
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as the court determines. If the county 
attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for 
release and the court determines from the evi-
dence that the petitioner is not entitled to recov-
ery of the property, it shall enter an order direct-
ing the county attorney to answer the petition 
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that 
period, the court shall order the release of the 
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition 
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court 
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days. 
At this hearing all interested parties may 
present evidence of their rights of release of the 
property following the state's evidence for forfei-
ture. The court shall determine by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the issues in the case and 
order forfeiture or release of the property as it 
determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent 
of any other proceedings, whether civil or crimi-
nal, under this act or the laws of this state. 
(i) When the court determines that claimants 
have no right in the property in whole or in part, 
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and 
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Divi-
sion of Finance. The division shall dispose of the 
property under Subsection (8). 
(j) When the court determines that property, 
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it 
shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it 
shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial 
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it 
sold and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legiti-
mate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the ac-
tion, including seizure, storage of the prop-
erty, legal costs of filing and pursuing the 
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for 
the General Fund, 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where 
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the 
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture pro-
ceeding, including seizure and storage of the 
property, against the individual or individuals 
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and 
may assess costs against any other claimant or 
claimants to the property as appropriate. 1987 
58-37-14. Resort for illegal use or possession of 
controlled substances deemed com-
mon nuisance — District court power 
to suppress and enjoin. 
(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house, 
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to 
which users or possessors of any controlled sub-
stances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or 
where use or possession of any substances violates 
this act, or which is used for illegal keeping, storing, 
or selling any substances listed as controlled sub-
stances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a 
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or 
maintain any such place. 
(2) The district court has the power to make any 
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nui-
sance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing 
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continua-
tion of a nuisance. 1971 
58-37-15. Burden of proof in proceedings on vi-
olations — Enforcement officers ex-
empt from liability. 
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any 
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any 
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading 
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act, 
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception 
is upon the person claiming its benefit. 
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly 
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registra-
tion, order form, or prescription issued under this act, 
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license, 
registration, order form, or prescription, and the bur-
den of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption. 
(3) No liability shall be imposed upon any duly au-
thorized state or federal officer engaged in the en-
forcement of this act who is engaged in the enforce-
ment of any law, municipal ordinance, or regulation 
relating to controlled substances. 1971 
58-37-16. Powers to order testimony of wit-
nesses or production of evidence — 
Immunity of witness compelled to tes-
tify. 
If the prosecuting attorney or attorney general of 
the state of Utah determines that the testimony of 
any witness or the production of any book, paper, or 
other evidence by any witness before a grand jury or 
court of the state of Utah involving any violation of 
this chapter is necessary, he shall make application 
to the court that the witness be instructed to testify 
or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this 
section and upon order of the court the witness shall 
not be excused from testifying or producing books, 
papers, or other evidence on the ground that the testi-
mony or evidence may tend to incriminate him or 
subject him to forfeiture. No witness shall be prose-
cuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture on ac-
count of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning 
which he is compelled to testify after having claimed 
his privilege against self-incrimination or produce ev-
idence nor shall any such evidence be used in any 
criminal proceeding against him in any court except 
prosecutions described in this section. No witness is 
exempt under this section from prosecution for per-
jury or contempt committed while giving testimony 
or producing evidence under compulsion. 1971 
58-37-17. J u d i c i a l rev iew. 
(1) Any person aggrieved by a department's final 
order may obtain judicial review. 
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings is in the district court of Salt Lake 
County. 1987 
Richard J. Leedy 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
230 East 3rd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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COUNTY ATTORNEY 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
AND NINETY-NINE DOLLARS, 
UNITED STATES CURRENCY, 
ONE PAGER SERIAL #0701843, 
AND ONE 4" SMITH AND WESSON 
4 4 MAGNUM GUN MODEL 29, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. C88-1078 
Honorable James S. Sawava 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
) 
Charles Goodsen, being first put on his oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. That I am an interested party; 
2. That my prior girlfriend was Lisa Martinez. 
3. She accompanied me on the day prior to seizure to 
Wendover, Nevada, where I won most of the money seized from in 
this matter. 
4. She could corroborate my testimony regarding the 
source of the money seized in this matter being non-cocaine 
related. 
5. Lisa Martinez was also the girl who delivered the 
Stipulation to Howard Lemcke in this matter. 
6. She would dispute Mr. Lemckefs testimony that he 
ask her if the Stipulation involved the $60.00 which was in his 
possession the second time I was arrested rather than the 
approximate $10,000.00 which was on me the first time I was 
arrested. 
7. She would, in fact, testify that Lemcke "asked her 
if I had $10,000.00 on me the second time I was arrested like the 
first time and she responded no, I had $60.00. 
8. Approximately two to three weeks ago, Lisa Martinez 
moved to Wisconsin; I have contacted her and she is unwilling to 
come to Salt Lake City to testify in my behalf and even if she 
were, neither she nor I have the fuads/to 
CHARLES "SOODSEN 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this (7^^ day of 
J u l y , 1988 
Itta AAM 
RestdLl"^ Ut Notary Public Residing in: / ../ww> , /tw„ . „- / 
My Commission Expires: \J C 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RENA BARBIERO #5033 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S-3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: 468-3421 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V 0 
NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
AND NINETY NINE DOLLARS, 
UNITED STATES CURRENCY, ] 
ONE PAGER SERIAL #0701843, 
AND ONE 4" SMITH AND WESSON ] 
44 MAGNUM GUN MODEL 29, 
Defendant. ] 
> FINDINGS OF FACTS 
AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C88-1078 
> Judge James S. Sawaya 
Trial was held on the above-captioned case on the 
9th day of September, 1988 before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Court Judge, 
Plaintiff, State of Utah, was represented by Rena 
Barbiero, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. The claimant 
was represented by Richard J. Leedy. 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Civil No. C88-1078 
Page two 
The parties presented evidence and argument to the 
Court and the Court having fully considered the same now 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. That jurisdiction is appropriate and this matter 
is properly before the court. 
2. That on January 7, 1988 the property described 
above, was seized to-wit: $9,199.00 in cash, cocaine a 
loaded 44 Magnum gun and pager were found upon and seized 
from Charles Goodson. 
3. That Charles Goodson purported to assign to 
Richard Leedy the monies seized on January 10, 1988. 
4. That Deputy Salt Lake County Howard Lemcke 
purportedly stipulated to release an unstated sum of money. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Wherefore, having made the foregoing Findings of 
Fact, the Court now makes, adopts and enters the following: 
1. The $9,199.00, gun, and pager is properly before 
this court as items subject to forfeiture as defined by 
Utah Code Annotated, 58-37-13 (1987). 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
Civil No. C88-1078 
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2. Charles Goodson was in possession of the 
defendant property. 
3. The money seized was in close proximity to 
controlled substances, raising a rebuttable presumption 
that it is forfeitable. 
4. Charles Goodson did not meet his burden of proof 
in overcoming the States presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence that the money was not drug related. 
5. The State's right to the money vested at the 
time of seizure and any subsequent transfer or assisgnment 
of the money was null and void. 
6. The gun was used to protect a controlled 
substance. 
7. The pager was used to facilitate a violation of 
the Controlled Substances Act. 
8. The forfeiture of the claimiant's property is 
granted. 
9. That the Salt Lake County Attorney is entitled 
to $1,380.00 to be paid by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office for costs incurred in pursuing said forfeiture. 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
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Let Judgment be entered accordingly: 
irt this f' Zs day of (0 ft Done in open COUJ 
1988 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COUR 
/ 
^JAMES S. SAWAYA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON h'lfc
 ; zv 
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:y 'w, . * 
Richard J. Leedy 
2241/ 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
RENA BARBIERO, being duly sworn, states that she is 
the attorney for Respondent State of Utah and that she served 
four (4) copies of the Brief of Respondent State of Utah upon 
Richard J. Leedy, Attorney for Appellant, 245 Vine Street, 
Suite 302, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, by delivering true 
copies thereof, on the o I day of March, 1989. 
RENA BARBIERO 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this *3/<o?f- day of 
iMarch, 1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My commission expires: 
November 23-;—1990 3-G~~(f ^ 
